

FROM THE CHIEF EDITOR



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Page unturned

The year has passed since the presidential candidate and the RF Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin spoke at the conference of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs on February 9, 2012. In his speech Vladimir V. Putin clearly identified the main causes of high social tension in the country, perhaps, for the first time since 2000:

“...what was going on in Russia in the 1990s. We have spoken a great deal about this, and we know that business back then amounted to nothing more than slicing up the state-owned pie”;

“...certainly, we need to turn this page as well... We need to close this period. There are different ways to do this. We need to discuss them with society and with experts, but we must do so in such a way that society agrees with the resolution of problems dating back to the 1990s, including patently unfair privatization and auctions of all kinds”;

“...what we absolutely have to do is ensure public legitimacy of the institute of private property and public trust in business. Otherwise we will not be able to develop a modern market economy, let alone create a healthy civil society” “...key steps should be taken in 2012”¹.

The first ten months of Vladimir Putin’s presidency have passed, and it can be noted that there were no specific instructions aimed at solving one of the most fundamental problems of modern Russian society – socially unfair privatization of state property. They were given neither in the first President’s Executive Orders (dated on May 7, 2012) nor in his Address to the Federal Assembly (12 December 2012).

In the Address to the Federal Assembly Vladimir V. Putin noted that “the high degree of offshore investments and ownerships in the Russian economy is an absolute fact” and “we are to strive for offshore transparency”. But no variants to “close” the problems of the 1990s were given for the society to discuss, which dealt with “patently unfair privatization and auctions of all kinds”.

¹ The speech of V.V. Putin at the conference of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, February 9, 2012. Official site of V.V. Putin. Available at: <http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/18052/>

Unfair privatization of the 1990s became the basis for the formation of an oligarchic and corrupt system of the state, which brought up the modern political elite and led to an unprecedented income inequality among Russia's citizens. In Russia, 1% of oligarchs and large owners account for about 40% of national income, while 1% of the richest people in the United States accounts for 8% of national income. Thus, inequality degree is 5 – 10 times higher in Russia than in the USA².

According to one renowned politician, “...the state power in Russia was forcing against Russia speaking on behalf of Russia during the last decades”³.

During the 1990s, existing oligarchic clans extracted minerals in Russia and appropriated most of the resource rents. And only in 2002, on the RF President Vladimir Putin's initiative a mineral extraction tax (MET) was imposed and tariffs on export were increased. This resulted in a 4.2-fold increase of the federal budget revenues

in 2011 as compared with 2000 (in constant prices), and the share of mineral extraction tax and foreign economic activity revenues in the budget increased from 20% to 58.7%⁴.

At the same time, the government continued to retreat under the pressure of the oligarchs and international financial speculators.

Thus, the last restrictions on foreign exchange regulation were canceled in Russia in 2006, which dramatically accelerated the capital outflow from the country⁵.

According to experts, federal and regional budgets lose up to 50% of tax revenues due to different legal ways to avoid taxes of large corporations and the political elite (*tab. 1*).

A serious analysis of the current situation in the country before the elections to the State Duma in December 2011 and the presidential elections in March 2012 in the conditions of the formation of a new political cycle, conducted by numerous experts,

² Yashina G.A. Progressive taxation: “pros and cons”. Federal Internet Edition “Capital of the country”. Available at: <http://kapitalrus.ru/articles/article/177034>

³ Shevchenko M. Financial triumphs. *Zavtra*. 2012. No. 37.

⁴ Mineral Extraction Tax (MET) was imposed on January 1, 2002 instead of the payments for the right to use subsurface resources, deductions for the replacement of the mineral raw material base, excise duty on oil and stable gas condensate, the share of which was about 80% in the structure of resource payments. Mineral extraction tax was aimed at the maximum simplification of tax collection for the state.

In fact, the events leading up to the imposition of mineral extraction tax were different. S.S. Gubanov describes them in his article “System choice of Russia and standard of living” as follows (*The Economist*, 2011. No. 11. P. 355): “1998 August default marked the full system crash of unlimited power of private-oligarchic property. The distribution of power began to be noticeably revolutionized. The fall of reactionary reformers' cabinet concealed the threat to the basis of the oligarchic property. The question had an edge to it who will win: will oligarchs win Russia or Russia beat oligarchs? Without waiting for the irreversible turn of scales, the comprador clan of oligarchs decided to sacrifice the secondary things to save their major priority – the predominance of their personalized property. They agreed to split their revenue with the state; thus, the system of extremely unusual, hybrid state and oligarchic partnership was developed, when the system domination continued to belong to the oligarchic property, but its revenues were partially privatized and partially nationalized. The social contract between the parties came into effect in 2001 along with the mechanism of mineral extraction tax formalized in legislation. Since then, the partial bite of taxes from export and raw material rent to the state budget, i.e. currency and budgetary nationalization, became the encumbrance for oligarchic property. Increasing the budget due to raw material export and petrodollars, the government acquired an opportunity to support domestic demand through budget expenditures and their indexing, and an oligarchic clan retained his property and comprador capital power at its disposal”.

⁵ According to the Central Bank of RF, the net capital outflow from Russia by the private sector and individuals amounted to 30.2 billion dollars in 2006 and 62 billion in 2007 (2008 – 164, 2009 – 72.2, 2010 – 56.3, 2011 – 111.9 billion dollars). Thus, at the end of 2011, the volume of cross-border transfers (3.6 trillion rubles) was equal to 62% of own territorial budgets revenues of RF (5.8 trillion rubles), and it was 2.6 times higher than the public debt of Russia (1.4 trillion rubles).

public figures, mass media, showed that in order to implement the faster growth policy it was necessary *“to restrain the furies of oligarchic business, corrupt officials vampires, a gang of werewolves wearing police epaulets, TV nightmares and other evil spirit bred in abundance on the rotting remains of the Soviet empire. They are the products of the post-Soviet power, so they should be eliminated by it with the purpose of self-preservation. Otherwise,*

*they either will have gorged the power and statehood remnants, or they will have been destroyed by the revolutionary fire. Both results will be catastrophic for Russia”*⁶.

Today’s information field in the country is rather clearly described by journalist M. Kononenko, *“We had the dashing 1990s and stable 2000s. And now we have the dashing years again but this time – the 2010s. More precisely – deputy”*⁷.

Table 1. Calculation of the possible increase in revenues to the budget of the Russian Federation, trillion rubles

Source	Actual value	Proposed variant	Consolidated budget of RF	Budgets of state non-budgetary funds	Federal budget	Budgets of the federal subjects of Russia
Cancellation or reduction of the rate of export VAT refund	18%	0–5% * ¹⁾	0.8		0.8	
Increase in the tax rate on dividends	5 – 9%	13 – 15% * ¹⁾	0.2 – 0.5			0.2 – 0.5
Introduction of progressive income tax rate	13% *	13–50% * ²⁾	2.0 – 4.5			2.0 – 4.5
Introduction of the tax on currency export	no	20% * ³⁾	0.5		0.5	
Cancelation of the limiting value of annual income, above which insurance payment are not taken	463 thsd. rub.	0 * ⁴⁾	0.5	0.5		
Total			4.0 – 6.8	0.5	1.3	2.2 – 5.0
<p>* There are the following income tax rates in foreign countries: USA – 1035%; Great Britain – 050%; Australia – 1747%; China – 545%; Japan – 550%; Denmark – 3859%; Ukraine – 1517%; Latvia – 26%.</p> <p>*¹⁾ Doctor of Economics N.A. Krichevskiy, ISEDT RAS.</p> <p>*²⁾ RAS Academician R.I. Nigmatulin, Doctor of Economics V.L. Inozemtsev, Doctor of Economics N.A. Krichevskiy, A.V. Bagaryakov, documents of political parties Just Russia, CPRF.</p> <p>*³⁾ Documents of Just Russia Party, Chairman of the Chamber of Tax Consultants D. Chernik.</p> <p>*⁴⁾ Doctor of Economics V.L. Inozemtsev, Economic Expert Group.</p>						

⁶ Glazyev S.Yu. Why is Putin? Zavtra. 2012. No. 9.

⁷ Kononenko M. Dashing deputy. Izvestia. 2013. No. 32. February 21. The author writes: “These are the headlines of last week. The Lipetsk City Duma deputy corpse rolled up in a barrel of cement was found in the vicinities of Moscow. The former Deputy Minister of the Moscow Oblast’s housing and public utilities was detained on suspicion of murder. The flat of a deputy of the Kirov Oblast’s Parliament was searched with regard to the case of the Urzhum Distilling Plant. The Ministry of the Interior found embezzlements running into billions in RusHydro. Ex-adviser of the Governor of the Murmansk Oblast misappropriated 430 million rubles. The former Deputy Head of Uralvagonzavod was arrested when he tried to escape from the country. Serdyukov’s son-in-law left Russia. The former Mayor of Ryazan was suspected of blackmail. The Chief of Staff of the Southern Military District was blamed for exceeding of authority. FSB conducted a search of the Transport Committee of St. Petersburg. A taxman was arrested for the extortion of 7 million rubles in the vicinities of Moscow. The Ministry of the Interior arrested a university teacher for the murder of his colleague. The Chief Oncologist of Russia left his post because his daughter and his deputy stole 39 million rubles. The Head of the Federal Agency for Fishery was involved in criminal proceeding. The former Chairman of the State Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles stole 1.5 billion rubles. That is, a criminal paradigm in Russia has completely changed. Deputies, officials, effective managers, as well as intellectuals joined them and represented by doctors and teachers have become dashing ones”.

Russian mass media is full of facts reflecting the conflict between different groups of the political elite⁸.

It seems that, when the staff of the Government was formed, the President of Russia excessively trusted people allowing some of them, who did not explicitly or implicitly support his policy thesis stated not only in his well-known articles but in his decrees dated May 7, 2012, to be included in the Government.

What other reasons can explain the fact that the Government did not build the funds into the budget for 2013 and 2014 – 2015 to implement the decrees dated May 7, 2012 on the main points of modernizing the economy of the country: increase in the salaries of teachers and doctors since 2013; modernization of the social sphere; the core funding of a military-industrial complex was postponed for a period after 2015.

More than 70% of budget expenditures on implementing the presidential decrees to raise wages of public sector employees for the period from 2013 to 2018 fall on the period from 2016 – 2018 (*tab. 2*).

“Citizens of Russia will feel very quickly the mistakes, which were not corrected by the Duma, because the tasks to raise the wages of state employees set by the President are not secured with the real financing; it appears that there is a hole in the regional budgets, which can be covered by nothing. Therefore, it will be not an increase in the wages of regions’ state employees but a profanation”⁹.

“Some commentators explain the retreat in financing of the social sphere by excessive appropriations for rearmament. This is a delusion: the Ministry of Finance treats the defense industry not much better than education. Besides that about a quarter of more than twenty trillion promised for eight years falls on the three-year period, and the Ministry of Finance shifted a part of this money to the following budgetary cycle replacing them by the loans of commercial banks during the current cycle.

The federal budget adopted in the third reading does not solve any problem: at best, it cowardly moves them for the indeterminate future. I’m not talking about the fact that it is plain folly to throw out money saved due to the castration of necessary expenses into formally security Western bonds. Throwing hundreds of billion rubles of our common resource rents into this maelstrom as before is only a little bit wildly than burning them”¹⁰.

In recent years, the most part of budget funding was shifted onto the lower levels. Governmental budget compels a significant part of the regional budgets to increase the national debt up to a critical point, increase commercial loans, and thus, it tightens a debt stranglehold.

Unfortunately, the increase in the role of federal budget is not provided in years to come.

All these and many other facts show that the Government of Dmitry A. Medvedev works in harness as “circular firing squad”, because the influence of elite groups holding

⁸ See, for example, media reports: “Disputed assessments on the case of Khodorkovsky: Dmitry Medvedev – he is “absolutely harmless” for the society; Vladimir Putin – “a thief should sit in jail”, he has “blood on his hands” (RIA-news, Grani.RU), “Letter of O. Golodets criticizing the Dima Yakovlev Law was sent to Vladimir Putin at the request of Dmitry Medvedev” (Interfax, December 26, 2012); “Vladimir Putin noted the worsening economic indicators and the lack of distinct strategy for the economic development of the country till 2018 at the enlarged session of the Government of the Russian Federation (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, January 13, 2013); “Dmitry Medvedev decided not to return “the winter time” despite the pre-election Putin’s promise (Gazeta.RU, February 7, 2013), etc.

⁹ Dmitrieva O. Citizens of Russia will feel very quickly the mistakes, which were not corrected by the Duma. Kommersant FM, 19.11.2012. Available at: <http://kommersant.ru/doc/2068055>

¹⁰ Privalov A. On ostrich budget. Expert. 2012.No. 47. November 21.

Table 2. Distribution of budget expenditures for the wages of public sector employees in the period from 2013 to 2018

Levels of budgetary system	2013 – 2015, bln. rub.	% from the total amount in the period from 2013 to 2018	2016 – 2018, bln. rub.	% from the total amount in the period from 2013 to 2018
Total	1332.4	27.0	3608.7	73.0
Federal budget	240.1	18.9	1029.6	81.1
Budgets of the federal subjects of Russia	1092.3	29.8	2579.1	70.2

Source: Programme of phased improvement of wages system in the state (municipal) institutions for the period from 2012 to 2018. Approved by the Decree of the Russian Government dated November 26, 2012 No. 2190-r.

various oligarchic groups is great. And the Chairman of the Government often sends signals that do not mobilize the members of the Government to implement the new policy of Vladimir V. Putin.

One of the principal points of divergence is the Government's desire to carry out the rapid privatization of state property once again. It seems that the point of view of the famous writer and economist N. Starikov is rather convincing.

"...1. The current round of privatization, which is guided personally by the Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, does not make sense from the standpoint of economics. Today there is no urgent need for money to sell the last shirt like a regular alcoholic in front of a pub.

2. The current round of privatization is none other than the camouflaged and accompanied by beautiful phrases free transfer of Russia's state property to the West.

3. Medvedev plans such a privatization only owing to ideological reasons. Dmitry Medvedev and his Government believe for some reason that it would be better for Russia"¹¹.

In this situation, there is a natural question: will the Government led by Dmitry A. Medvedev be able to realize the goals stated in the programme of the President Vladimir V. Putin and specified in his decree of May 7, 2012?

In all probability, the RF President Vladimir V. Putin should continue the systemic unconditional implementation of his election programme for benefit of the future of the country and most people in Russia. One of these steps could be considering for the basis the suggestions of RAS Academician S.Yu. Glazyev and RAS Corresponding Member G.G. Fetisov set in the report "On the strategy of sustainable development of Russia's economy"¹².

The breakthrough strategy "differs from the programmes offered by governmental and other 'system-related' experts in the fact, that though it deals mainly with the economy, it overcomes the 'macroeconomic determinism', by integrating this important area of the state's responsibility into the global and Russian historical context: **science, technology, culture, rational nature management, political and civil relations – these 'productive forces' are as important as finances or entrepreneurial initiative"**¹³.

In recent months, it can be clearly seen the President's activity in initiating the additional measures to create the conditions for the implementation of his election programme aimed at the significant improvement of life quality of most people, strengthening of Russia's competitiveness in a globalizing

¹¹ Official site of N. Starikov. Available at: <http://nstarikov.ru/blog/22314>

¹² The main provisions of the report by S.Yu. Glazyev and G.G. Fetisov are presented by them in the article of the same name (Economist, 2013, No. 1), reprinted in this issue.

¹³ Ibid, p. 13.

Table 3. Dynamics of the approval index of the RF President among different social groups in the Vologda Oblast

Category	Dec. 2007 (V.V. Putin)	Dec. 2011* (D.A. Medvedev)	Downward change in index, in points
Total population	163.5	116.0	47.5
20% with the highest income	170.2	130.0	40.2
Women	166.2	121.5	44.7
With specialized secondary education	168.5	119.8	48.7
60% with average income	170.5	118.8	51.7
Aged under 30	164.5	118.3	46.2
Aged over 55	167.8	118.1	49.7
With secondary and incomplete secondary education	158.7	115.8	42.9
Aged 30 – 55	160.5	113.5	47.0
With higher and incomplete higher education	164.2	112.8	51.4
Men	160.4	109.1	51.3
20% with the lowest income	149.6	96.7	52.9
* Ranked by December 2011.			

world, creation of all the necessary conditions for inviolable sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

Apparently, this is only the beginning of painful purification of various power federal and regional elite clans from all the kinds of corrupt officials, immoral persons in political and economic life of the country.

The solution of the main problem of the early 1990s – unfair privatization – and it is the base in large part of political clans, will require system measures for not only “convincing” the members of the Government, but also improving moral climate in the country; and it should be done without destroying the capacity of the state, more than 45 million electors of Vladimir V. Putin voted for this.

The President Vladimir V. Putin could not turn over the page of unfair privatization in 2012. It is 2013. We waited for a longer time. But the RF President Vladimir V. Putin should not stop, it is necessary to pull this


thorn out of the soul of a Russian citizen. We must turn over the page!

It should be noted that the long sociological monitoring shows the evolution of citizens’ estimates of political leaders, including the Head of the state. The Editorial Board of the Journal regularly publishes the results of this monitoring that concerns the dynamics of the changes in the population’s approval of the President of the Russian Federation, the Prime Minister, governmental institutes and political parties.

If we compare the approval ratings of the President Vladimir V. Putin in 2007, at the end of his second term, and the approval ratings of the President Dmitry A. Medvedev in 2011, during the last year of his presidency, we can see that Dmitry A. Medvedev lost from 25% to 30% of people who approved his activity as the Head of the state (*tab. 3*). That is an objective evaluation of his activities in the period from 2008 to 2011 by the region’s population.

A more detailed information is given below, in the diagrams (P. 16-19).


Dynamics of the RF President's activity approval index*



The RF President's activity approval index has fixed at the level of 126.3 points in February 2013 exceeding the figures for the previous months in 2012 and December 2011.


Fig. 1. Population of the Vologda Oblast

Dynamics of the approval index of the RF President among men and women



The RF President's activity approval index among the men of the region has increased in February 2013 and fixed at the highest level for the whole measurement period (119.9 points).

Fig. 2. Men




The RF President's activity approval among women has improved for the recent months: the relevant index fixed at the level of 131.5 points exceeding the figures of the previous measurements.

Fig. 3. Women


* The balance of positive and negative responses has been marked by a yellow dotted line (index is equal to 100 points) Index above 100 points indicates the predominance of positive responses over negative ones (green), index below 100 points – the opposite situation (red).

Dynamics of the RF President's activity approval index in the age groups




After a significant decline at the end of 2012, the RF President's activity approval index in the age group under 30 increased in February 2013 and fixed at the highest level as compared to the previous months in 2012 and December 2011 (129 points).

Fig. 4. Age group under 30



The RF President's activity approval index in the age group from 30 to 55 has not significantly changed for the recent two months (120.9 points), and it remains higher than it was in December 2011.


Fig. 5. Age group of 30 – 55



The RF President's activity approval index in the age group over 55 has significantly increased for the period from December 2012 to February 2013 (from 118.3 up to 132.8 points). Estimates are more favorable than at the end of 2011.


Fig. 6. Age group over 55

Dynamics of the RF President's activity approval index in the education groups




After a sharp decline in December 2012, the RF President's activity approval index among the people who have secondary and incomplete secondary education has significantly increased (from 102.4 up to 120.8 points) in early 2013 exceeding the figures of the previous measurements.

Fig. 7. Secondary and incomplete secondary education



The tendency to improve the estimates of the RF President's activity among the people who have specialized secondary education, which began in August 2012, continued in February 2013. The approval index reached 127.7 points and exceeded the figures of December 2011.


Fig. 8. Specialized secondary education



The RF President's activity approval index among the people who have higher and incomplete higher education has not significantly changed for the recent two months (130.2 points). Estimates are more favorable than at the end of 2011.


Fig. 9. Higher and incomplete higher education

Dynamics of the RF President's activity approval index in the income groups




The RF President's activity approval index in the group covering 20% of people who have the lowest incomes in the region has significantly increased (up to 99.6 points), but it remains lower than the neutral level.

Fig. 10. 20% with the lowest income



The RF President's activity approval index in the group covering 60% of people who have average incomes in the region (from 120.3 up to 131.8 points) in February 2013 as compared to the period of two months ago, and it exceeded the figures of the previous measurements.

Fig. 11. 60% with average income



There was a slight decline in the RF President's activity approval index in the group covering 20% of people who have the highest incomes in the region in the period from December 2012 to February 2013 (from 141 down to 139 points). At the same time, these estimates remain more optimistic as compared to the previous measurements.

Fig. 12. 20% with the highest income

As in the previous issues, we publish the results of the recent public opinion monitoring of the state of the Russian society*.

The following tables show the dynamics of some parameters of social well-being and socio-political sentiments in the Vologda Oblast for the period from December 2011 to February 2013.

Table 1. Estimation of power activity (How do you assess the current activity of..?)

Vertical power structure	Approval, in % to the total number of respondents								Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2011		Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2012	
	Dec. 2011	Feb. 2012	Apr. 2012	June 2012	Aug. 2012	Oct. 2012	Dec. 2012	Feb. 2013				
The President of the RF	51.7	47.3	50.3	54.5	53.7	50.9	53.3	55.5		1.07		1.04
The Chairman of the Government of the RF	52.9	52.6	51.7	49.5	48.5	47.1	48.3	47.9	0.91		0.99	
The Governor of the Vologda Oblast	41.9	37.7	37.7	44.7	45.3	43.6	42.5	43.0		1.03		1.01

Vertical power structure	Disapproval in % to the total number of respondents								Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2011		Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2012	
	Dec. 2011	Feb. 2012	Apr. 2012	June 2012	Aug. 2012	Oct. 2012	Dec. 2012	Feb. 2013				
The President of the RF	35.7	35.7	33.3	28.9	31.1	32.1	34.6	29.2	0.82		0.84	
The Chairman of the Government of the RF	32.7	32.0	33.1	31.5	34.5	32.8	35.9	34.4		1.05	0.96	
The Governor of the Vologda Oblast	6.1	33.8	32.6	31.8	32.7	33.7	35.4	33.8	0.94		0.95	

Notes. Hereinafter, it is pointed out: green – improvement; yellow – without changes; red – change for the worse.

* The polls are held six times a year in Vologda, Cherepovets, and in eight districts of the oblast (Babayevsky District, Velikoustyugsky District, Vozhegodsky District, Gryazovetsky District, Kirillovsky District, Nikolsky District, Tarnogsky District, Sheksninsky District). The method of the survey is a questionnaire poll by place of residence of respondents. The volume of a sample population is 1500 people aged from 18 and older. The sample is purposeful and quoted. Representativeness of the sample is ensured by the observance of the proportions between the urban and rural populations, the proportions between the inhabitants of settlements of various types (rural communities, small and medium-sized city), age and sex structure of the adult population of the region. Sampling error does not exceed 3%.

The coefficient of change shows the ratio of data for February 2013 to December 2011 and December 2012.

The results of the ISED T RAS polls are available at www.vscs.ac.ru

Table 2. What party expresses your interests?

Party	In % to the total number of respondents									Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2011	Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2012	
	Dec. 2011	Elections for the State Duma 2011, fact	Feb. 2012	Apr. 2012	June 2012	Aug. 2012	Oct. 2012	Dec. 2012	Feb. 2013			
United Russia	26.1	33.4	26.0	28.3	31.9	31.4	26.6	30.4	30.5		1.17	1.00
KPRF	13.4	16.8	10.1	11.4	10.0	9.5	10.4	12.2	9.7	0.72		0.80
LDPR	9.2	15.4	9.1	9.5	7.7	6.7	6.8	7.2	6.3	0.68		0.88
Just Russia	13.9	27.2	10.2	8.2	4.6	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.3	0.38		0.96
Other	4.6	-	3.1	3.2	2.8	2.3	2.4	3.5	3.5	0.76		1.00
No party	23.9	-	25.7	28.6	31.5	33.2	36.1	32.5	35.3		1.48	1.09
It's difficult to answer	9.0	-	15.8	10.8	11.6	11.1	12.3	8.7	9.3		1.03	1.07

Table 3. Estimation of social condition

In % to the total number of respondents								Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2011	Dynamics indices, Feb. 2013 to Dec. 2012	
Dec. 2011	Feb. 2012	Apr. 2012	June 2012	Aug. 2012	Oct. 2012	Dec. 2012	Feb. 2013			
What would you say about your mood in the last days?										
Usual condition, good mood										
64.2	62.9	63.4	69.0	71.3	69.0	68.0	66.6		1.04	0.98
Feeling stress, anger, fear, depression										
30.2	33.5	30.2	23.4	23.3	25.5	26.5	30.5		1.01	1.15
What statement, in your opinion, suits the current occasion best of all?										
Everything is not so bad; it's difficult to live, but it's possible to stand it										
78.6	74.9	76.5	77.3	73.2	77.5	79.9	75.5	0.96		0.94
It's impossible to bear such plight										
14.1	18.1	16.8	13.6	17.0	15.6	13.7	16.1		1.14	1.18
Consumer Sentiment Index										
85.6	89.8	90.1	93.4	92.3	91.7	91.7	92.3		1.08	1.01
What category do you belong to?										
The share of people who consider themselves to be poor and extremely poor										
41.9	43.2	43.6	45.0	44.2	44.1	47.0	45.9		1.10	0.98
The share of people who consider themselves to have average income										
42.2	44.9	46.5	45.3	43.4	44.7	43.4	44.3		1.05	1.02

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As in the previous issues, we publish the journal articles rating in this one.

The first ten articles, published in 2010-2013, according to the frequency of their viewing for the recent 12 months (March 2012 — February 2013)

Rating	Article	Total time of reading for the recent 12 months, minutes	Total time of reading, for the whole accounting period*, minutes	Number of views for the whole accounting period	Number of views for the recent 12 months	Number of views for the recent 3 months	Average time of viewing for the whole accounting period*, minutes	Issue	Release date	Authors
1	Agriculture of the Vologda Oblast on the eve of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organisation	6957	6957	207	207	151	34	No.21	June 2012	Anishchenko Nikolay Ivanovich Ivanova Marina Nikolayevna Bilkov Valentin Alekseyevich
2	Modernization of the Russian economy as the imperative of the country's prospective innovative development	4559	5139	185	150	3	28	No.16	August 2011	Kondakov Igor Anatolyevich
3	Threats to the region's economic security and the ways to overcome them	1482	3169	160	66	14	20	No.14	April 2011	Uskova Tamara Vitaliyevna Kondakov Igor Anatolyevich
4	Fiscal federalism and inter-budget relations in the Russian Federation	1421	2771	199	91	6	14	No.13	February 2011	Avetisyan Ishkhan Artashovich
5	Methodology of the comparative estimation of the scientific and technical potential of the region	1081	3496	183	54	8	19	No.12	December 2010	Zadumkin Konstantin Alekseyevich Kondakov Igor Anatolyevich
6	Demographic problems of the Republic of Belarus and their solutions	1070	1370	98	76	23	14	No.16	August 2011	Shakhoiko Lyudmila Petrovna
7	The post-crisis economic development and prospects of innovation activity in the Tomsk Oblast	1055	1260	45	34	3	28	No.15	June 2011	Myakota Ekaterina Aleksandrovna Vorobyov Aleksandr Grigoryevich Putilov Aleksandr Valentinovich Zhiganov Aleksandr Nikolayevich
8	Topical issues of the improvement of inter-governmental dealings in the system of local government	688	688	43	43	8	16	No.19	March 2012	Uskova Tamara Vitaliyevna Pechenskaya Mariya Aleksandrovna
9	Assessment of the critical threshold values of the indicators of the state of Russian society and their use in the socio-economic development management	626	626	30	30	11	21	No.22	August 2012	Glazhev Sergey Yuryevich Lokosov Vyacheslav Veniaminovich
10	Migratory processes as mirrored by the transformations: border regions in Russia	550	811	37	18	4	22	No.14	April 2011	Mikhel Egor Aleksandrovich Krutova Oxana Sergeevna

* Account of the site's viewing has been carried out since 2009, December, 12.