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The 2018–2019 Regional Election: Voters' Trust in the Authorities Continues to Decline



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Abstract. September 8 was a single voting day in Russia: 13 constituent entities of the Russian Federation elected deputies of state legislative bodies¹; 19 constituent entities elected their heads². This was one of the main events of 2019 for the domestic political life of Russia, because the results of the elections, in fact, reflect the socio-political agenda of today; they show people's attitude toward the political and economic course implemented by the Russian government and serve as a criterion for assessing its effectiveness. The following materials provide an analysis of the electoral preferences of Russians, manifested in the level of support for the head of state and reflecting the interests of the ruling elites of the United Russia

¹ The republics of Altai, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Crimea, Mari El, Tatarstan, Tyva; Khabarovsk Krai; Bryansk, Volgograd, Tula oblasts; the cities of Moscow and Sevastopol.

² The republics of Altai, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia; Zabaikalsky and Stavropol krais, the Astrakhan, Volgograd, Vologda, Kurgan, Kursk, Lipetsk, Murm+ansk, Orenburg, Sakhalin, Chelyabinsk oblasts; Saint Petersburg, as well as the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Crimea, in which the heads of constituent entities of the Russian Federation were appointed through a vote in Parliament.

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party; in the dynamics of voter turnout in Russia and in the number of votes cast for parliamentary parties representing the systemic opposition. To obtain an objective “picture” of today, we analyse the results of the previous elections (2017–2018), as well as the last three elections to the State Duma (2007, 2011, 2016) and the presidential elections in which Vladimir Putin took part (2000, 2004, 2012, 2018).

Key words: elections, electoral preferences, President, trust, public administration efficiency.

Elections are the most common form of direct participation of citizens in the political life of the country; they are a kind of marker that helps determine the extent to which the people are interested in politics, how they assess the course of socio-economic development implemented by the current government, which political agenda best meets their needs and expectations. From this point of view, the data on citizens' electoral preferences are an important empirical material for scientific analysis and understanding of public sentiment.

The elective way of formation of the most important authorities, and the regular holding of free and fair elections are among the most telling indicators of real democracy of the political system existing in the country, the main criteria of its legitimacy, i.e. recognition by society or by its majority³.

However, it would be incorrect to analyze the results of the Single day of voting held in September 2019, without making a preliminary general assessment of the situation in the country and the relations that have developed between society and the authorities at present.

First of all, we should note that the past year and a half of the current political cycle (the beginning of which can be considered the 2018 presidential election and the beginning of Vladimir Putin's fourth presidential term) were filled with many contradictory events and factors.

³ Trusov N.A. The goal, value and significance of elections in the democratic system of government. *Vestnik TsIK RF*. Available at: <http://vestnik.cikrf.ru/vestnik/publications/opinions/22508.html>

According to experts, the ruling elite includes three main groups:

- ✓ “liberal-family” (a group that “received the main benefits from privatization” and today “has an almost total control over the economic and financial policy of the country”);
- ✓ “security officials (“siloviki”) and oligarchs of the second generation, 2000s”;
- ✓ “regional elites, primarily national”, who are “more inclined to support the “security officials”, but are desperately fighting for privileges and for access to budget funds”.

All other forces in Russia (“leftists”, monarchists, Russian nationalists, etc.) are highly marginalized and have no resources to strengthen their position. The only exception is the patriotic forces, which have greatly increased following the events in Ukraine⁴.

We can say that Putin's triumphant victory in the presidential election in March 2018 once again showed that to Russian society he is the “President of hope”⁵ and that “Russian society, in essence, trusts only the President”⁶. The official results of the State Duma election and the presidential election indicate that Russian people's support for the United Russia party (which since 2016 has a constitutional

⁴ Khazin M. Putin's system of “checks and balances” begins to change in front of our eyes. *Information and analytical website “Zakon vremeni”*, 2016, June 5. Available at: <https://zakonvremeni.ru/analytics/7-3-/27227-mixail-xazin-sistema-qsdierzhek-i-protivovesovq-putina-nachinaet-menyatsya-naglax.html>

⁵ The President of hope. *Information portal Allpravda*, 2018, March 9. Available at: <http://allpravda.info/prezident-nadezhdy-59257.html>

⁶ Surkov V. Vladimir Putin's Long State. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2019, February 11. Available at http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-02-11/5_7503_surkov.html

Figure 1. Number of votes cast for Vladimir Putin in the presidential elections in the period from 2000 to 2018, people





Figure 2. Number of votes cast for the United Russia party in the elections to the State Duma for the period from 2000 to 2016, people



Note. + / - show the increase / decrease in the number of people who voted for Vladimir Putin in the presidential elections and for the United Russia party in the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (million people).

majority in Parliament and represents the interests of Russia's ruling elites) and their support for Vladimir Putin are completely different (*Insert 1–2*).

Thus, in the election held March 14, 2004 (that is, following V. Putin's first presidential term), support for the President increased by almost 10 million votes (from 39.7 to 49.6 million; *Figure 1; Insert 1*). And the turnout of Russians at the polling stations was 64.38%.

In March 2012 compared to the 2004 presidential election⁷, support for V. Putin fell slightly (by four million votes; from 49.6 to 45.6 million, with a turnout of 65.34%). However, this is most likely due to the fact that in the period from 2008 to 2012, Dmitry Medvedev was President, and that the world financial crisis also occurred during the same period.

⁷ Dmitry Medvedev ran for President of the Russian Federation in 2008. 52.5 million people voted for him (70.28%), voter turnout was 69.81%. Such high rates are primarily associated with the recovery of the Russian economy and living standards in the mid-2000s, with 2007 being the most successful year in this regard. However, since we are not talking about the institution of the presidency in Russia, but about the role of V. Putin's personality for the country and Russian society, we excluded the 2008 presidential election from our analysis.

In March 2018 (already at the end of V. Putin's third presidential term), the number of his supporters increased by another 10.8 million votes (from 45.6 to 56.4 million), reaching a record level for the entire period from 2000 to the present. Voter turnout in the last presidential election was also the highest: 67.54%.

Different dynamics are observed with regard to support for the United Russia party in the elections to the State Duma of the fourth – seventh convocations (*Figure 2; Insert 2*). A significant increase in the number of votes was observed only in 2007 compared to 2003 (by 21.9 million, from 22 to 44 million). Perhaps this is due to the fact that in 2007 the leader of the party was V. Putin, and in 2003 – B. Gryzlov.

Since 2007, the number of voters supporting the representation of United Russia in Parliament has been steadily decreasing: from 2007 to 2011 – by 12 million votes (from 44 to 32 million); from 2011 to 2016 – by another 4 million (from 32 to 28 million). At the same time, the turnout at the State Duma elections (especially in 2016) has always been lower than at the presidential elections (in 2003 – 55.67%,

The overall list of problems is still dominated by purely economic ones. **But the share of “political” issues of concern among citizens has been growing at the highest rate for last two decades... Russians are increasingly aware that the key to solving their financial problems lies not in the economic aspect, but in the political one.** Therefore, when citizens talk about the problems of injustice expressed in various forms, they name the signs of the current system of government and talk about the need for changes in the political model, the changes that will improve their well-being⁸.

in 2007 – 63.71%, in 2011 – 60.21%, in 2016 – 47.88%), which in itself indicates a higher interest of people in the presidential elections.

The main points of the program for strategic development of Russia for the period up to 2024, voiced by V. Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on March 1, 2018, found wide support in Russian society, which since 2014 has been accumulating the desire for dynamic development and change⁹ and in which there has been an increasing awareness of the fact that the solution to the most acute socio-economic issues should be sought not in the economic, but in the political sphere.

V. Putin's election campaign promises were embodied in the May 2018 decrees and national projects, the first results of which the President promised to sum up “at the beginning of the next [2020] year”.

However, the implementation of national projects faced obstacles that turned into an insurmountable barrier to the timely and comprehensive implementation of the President's decrees and, in particular, led to under-fulfillment of the May 2012 decrees.

⁸ The request for justice is getting louder. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2019, September 25. Available at: http://www.ng.ru/economics/2019-09-25/4_7685_bednost.html

⁹ Petukhov V.V. Dynamics of the social attitudes of the Russia's citizens and making of a public demand for change. *Sotsis*, 2018, no. 11, pp. 40–53.

In the near future, this year, people should feel real changes for the better. It is on the basis of citizens' opinions and assessments that we will sum up the first results of work on the national projects early next year. And we will draw appropriate conclusions about the quality and results of the work of all levels of executive power¹⁰.

First, the course of independent foreign policy pursued by the President naturally faces opposition from the West, which imposes economic sanctions on Russia, cuts foreign investment, disseminates anti-Russian sentiments, etc. Second, many members of Russia's ruling elite (whose interests, in many ways, are expressed by the party that has a constitutional majority in the State Duma) are guided by the principle of “capitalism for the few”, which involves the dominance of personal interests over national development objectives. This leads to regular failure to execute the orders of the head of state, changes in the methods of calculation of targets, postponement of their implementation, etc.

If we protect the national interests of Russia, then we will have to quarrel with the West for real, and not as it is now. And in this case, a huge number of representatives of the Russian “offshore aristocracy” will lose their houses in Paris, palaces in London and castles in Austria, Scotland, etc. And what should we do with them? They will be dissatisfied and as a whole, being reasonable, vigorous and effective individuals, they will wage a very skillful war against the policy of protection of national interests of Russia threatening their property in the West¹¹.

¹⁰ Address of the President to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, February 20, 2019. *Official Website of the President of the Russian Federation*. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863>

¹¹ Delyagin M.G. Liberals treat Russia like a cutlet – an object of consumption. Available at: <https://www.delyagin.ru/articles/187-pozitsija/43668-liberaly-otnosjatsja-k-rossii-kak-kotle-ek-ektu-potreblenija>

Insert 1

Voter turnout and support for Vladimir Putin in the Russian Presidential elections in 2000, 2004, 2012 and 2018 (data of the Central Election Commission)

Turnout in the Russian Presidential elections in 2000, 2004, 2012 and 2018 (ranked according to the data for 2018)

Territory	Turnout, %										Turnout, people			
	2000		2004		2012		2018		Dynamics (+/-) 2004 to 2012		Dynamics (+/-) 2004 to 2000		Dynamics (+/-) 2018 to 2012	
	2000	2004	2004	2012	2012	2018	2018	2012	2018	2012	2018	2018	2012	2018
Russian Federation	68.7	64.38	65.34	67.54	-4.32	+2.20	75 181 071	69581430	71780800	73624100	-5 599 641	+1843300		
North Caucasian Federal District*	-	-	83.24	86.29	+3.05	4492669	-	4850804	4492669	4850804	-	+358135		
Southern Federal District	74.14	77.82	63.53	69.77	+3.68	11054096	11052188	6875173	6875173	10747435	-1 908	+3872262		
Volga Federal District	71.9	68.65	68.69	69.24	-3.25	17058364	16224425	16186857	16186857	15868095	-833 939	-318762		
Central Federal District	69.78	61.54	63.9	66.16	-8.24	20036294	17519613	18353767	18353767	18687906	-2 516 681	+334139		
Siberian Federal District	66.81	63.86	65.28	67.67	-2.95	22574208	9023609	9896353	9896353	8834428	-13 550 599	-1061925		
Far Eastern Federal District	66.71	68.79	64.34	65.99	+2.08	3274077	3037762	3069840	3069840	3432301	-236 315	+362461		
Ural Federal District	68.37	64.76	65.26	67.13	-3.61	5814556	5638954	5856857	5856857	5925663	-175 602	+68806		
Northwestern Federal District	68.98	61.07	64.03	65.17	-7.91	7819362	6645479	7095082	7095082	6950195	-1 173 883	-144887		

Dynamics of the share of votes cast for Vladimir Putin (ranked according to the data for 2018)

Territory	In %										People			
	2000		2004		2012		2018		Dynamics (+/-) 2004 to 2000		Dynamics (+/-) 2018 to 2012		Dynamics (+/-) 2018 to 2012	
	2000	2004	2004	2012	2012	2018	2018	2012	2018	2012	2018	2018	2012	2018
Russian Federation	51.95	71.31	63.6	76.69	+19.36	+13.09	39 740 434	49563020	45602075	56426399	+9822586	+10824324		
North Caucasian Federal District*	-	-	84	86.92	-	+2.92	-	-	3713875	4210607	-	+496732		
Southern Federal District	58.34	80.27	65.49	82.49	+21.93	+17.0	6319400	8344980	4382194	7007737	+2025580	+2625543		
Volga Federal District	54.47	72.28	66.17	76.93	+17.81	+10.76	9435625	12022837	11015125	12270602	+2587212	+1255477		
Central Federal District	50.95	66.69	58.8	76.18	+15.74	+17.38	9927543	11187562	10354176	14033866	+1260019	+3679690		
Siberian Federal District	48.62	71.18	63.86	73.71	+22.56	+9.85	4188614	5998297	5834680	6835622	+1809683	+1000942		
Far Eastern Federal District	57.17	70.71	61.38	68.99	+13.54	+7.61	1542987	1959738	1835252	1988542	+416751	+133290		
Ural Federal District	56.98	73.13	64.91	74.67	+16.15	+9.76	3244577	4117193	3862545	4440709	+872616	+578164		
Northwestern Federal District	62.69	74.92	61.2	75.64	+12.23	+14.44	4926581	4986428	4273033	5247840	+59847	+974807		

* Here and further, Insert 2 has no data on the North Caucasian Federal District for 2000–2007 due to the fact that this federal district was created in 2010.

Insert 2

**Voter turnout and support for the United Russia party in the elections to the RF State Duma
in 2007, 2011 and 2016 (data of the Central Election Commission)**

Voter turnout in the elections to the RF State Duma in 2007, 2011 and 2016 (ranked according to the data for 2016)

Territory	Turnout, %				Turnout, people				Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2007	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2011	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2007
	2007	2011	2016	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2011	2007	2011	2016	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2011			
Russian Federation	63.78	60.21	47.88	-12.33	69609446	65766594	52700992	-13065602	-16908454		
North Caucasian Federal District*	–	86.46	82.22	-4.24	–	4544971	4343313	-201658	–		
Southern Federal District	63.22	61.51	48.27	-13.24	6621657	6510122	5896748	-613374	-724909		
Volga Federal District	69.13	64.30	54.44	-9.86	16043964	15100550	13083343	-2017207	-2960621		
Central Federal District	60.98	58.78	45.29	-13.49	17546326	17049621	12270883	-4778738	-5275443		
Siberian Federal District	66.45	58.19	46.70	-11.49	9351476	8212790	6599218	-1613572	-2752258		
Far Eastern Federal District	63.68	55.83	42.92	-12.91	2986327	2530907	1870528	-660379	-1115799		
Ural Federal District	65.51	59.07	48.83	-10.24	6039397	5273346	4258200	-1015146	-1781197		
Northwestern Federal District	61.23	57.65	43.18	-14.47	6520540	6234123	4378759	-1855364	-2141781		

Dynamics of the share of votes cast for the United Russia party (ranked according to the data for 2016)

Territory	In %				People				Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2007	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2011	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2007
	2007	2011	2016	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2011	2007	2011	2016	Dynamics (+/-) 2016 to 2011			
Russian Federation	64.30	49.31	54.20	+4.89	44714241	32371737	28527828	-3843909	-16186413		
North Caucasian Federal District*	–	81.52	76.88	-4.64	–	3617187	3419444	-197743	–		
Southern Federal District	65.45	54.81	58.27	+3.46	4290232	3363306	3472091	+108785	-818141		
Volga Federal District	67.30	52.41	55.93	+3.52	11120950	8472634	7903534	-569100	-3217416		
Central Federal District	59.07	42.96	49.33	+6.37	10237771	7422895	5882747	-1540148	-4355024		
Siberian Federal District	66.32	46.12	46.69	+0.57	5892147	3561156	3298976	-262180	-2593171		
Far Eastern Federal District	63.96	45.61	44.58	-1.03	1830758	1020880	767917	-252963	-1062841		
Ural Federal District	62.66	44.43	44.46	+0.03	3859409	2346351	1887550	-458801	-1971859		
Northwestern Federal District	59.80	39.71	44.04	+4.33	3728556	2370660	1895569	-475091	-1832987		

In fact, these two factors impede the implementation of an independent effective domestic policy focused on national interests throughout V. Putin's entire presidential term.

The Russian economy is included in the world economy in the status of "service economy", because "industry does not produce industrial products, it produces money for shareholders"¹². Fixed assets of the country were and remain in non-state ownership (in 2000 – 75%, in 2017 – 78%¹³). Major metallurgical corporations in the country have a significant number of foreign citizens in their boards of directors. All this points to the close connection of the ruling elite of Russia with Western countries, and this forces the President to act very carefully, without crossing the line, which can lead to an uprising of the elites with the active support of the "collective West".

Therefore, Many of V. Putin's management decisions are very contradictory: on the one hand, the President regularly demands the fulfillment of his instructions on time and in full, points out to Ministers the need to achieve concrete and tangible results, reproaches them for inconsistency of actions, etc. On the other hand, he trusts the implementation of projects vital for Russia to the team that failed to fully implement the May 2012 decrees and, according to some estimates, simply "sabotages the implementation of his orders"¹⁴.

As a result, the key problems of Russia remain unresolved from year to year and are stagnant. "The Swiss research firm Credit Suisse puts Russia **on the first place in terms of property inequality**, claiming that 80% of

the assets that are located in the territory of the Russian Federation belong to 10% of the population. It means that on this indicator we have overtaken all countries of the world"¹⁵. Russia "does not catch up with other countries **in terms of the quality of medical care**, and this gap is increasing every year, as the vast majority of countries in the world are rapidly increasing the share of medicine in their GDP"¹⁶. According to experts, the course of economic policy implemented by the Government, "**cannot provide stable economic growth rates above 1.5–2%**"¹⁷...

In general, Russia has one of the lowest health care costs, if taken as a percentage of GDP. Russia spends **2.6%** of GDP on medicine, while the G7 countries – **from 8 to 12%**... Russia occupies the last, 50th place in the international rating of quality of medical care.

If in 2003 in Russia there were more than **10 thousand** hospitals, in 2010 there were only **6.3 thousand**, now a little more than 5 thousand ... The number of beds in hospitals decreased **from 1.6 to 1.2 million**.

According to the Minister of Healthcare Skvortsova, **7,917** buildings of hospitals and polyclinics in the Russian Federation are in disrepair, most require demolition. **In 499** settlements of the country there are no doctors at all. In Russia, **40%** of medical equipment, that is, 20 thousand units, is worn out. Social programs for doctors have been long forgotten. In 2018, six regions of the Russian Federation provided absolutely no social assistance to doctors¹⁸.

¹² Betelin V.V. Russia needs to abandon the "economy of services" and shift to the economy of industrial production. *Ekonomist*, 2019, no. 2, pp. 3–12.

¹³ *Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2016: Statistics Collection*. Moscow: Rosstat, 2019. P. 299.

¹⁴ See, for example: interviews with S. Glazyev on the TV channel "Tsargrad" (April 5, 2018. Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSMYR5a68Cg>), M. Khazin (May 14, 2018), M. Delyagin (July 9, 2019. Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/news/hazin-novoe-pravitelstvo-predprimet-tihij-sabotazh-ukazov-putina_132009)

¹⁵ The first place: according to the level of social inequality the Russian Federation is ahead of all. *News IA Regnum*, March 7, 2019. Available at: <https://regnum.ru/news/economy/2586777.html>

¹⁶ Bobylev S.N., Grigor'ev L.M. (Eds.). *The UN Sustainable Development Goals and Russia: a Report on Human Development in the Russian Federation*. Moscow, 2016. P. 40.

¹⁷ Ivanter V.V. On the opportunities for the acceleration of economic growth in Russia. *Obshchestvo i ekonomika*, 2019, no. 7, pp. 5 – 11.

¹⁸ Gurdin K. Doctors run, ministers get better. *Argumenty nedeli*, 2019, no. 33 (677), August 28. Available at: <https://argumenti.ru/society/2019/08/626823>

The level of execution of federal budget expenditures for the implementation of national projects and the comprehensive plan in the first half of 2019 was **lower than the average by 10 percentage points** and amounted to 32.4%. According to the auditors, the money allocated to the regions by the federal center was spent by 18.5%.

According to the monitoring of the Accounts Chamber (as of September 20), the indicators that measure successes or failures have not been identified for three out of nine national targets. We are literally going backwards on four goals: sustainable natural population growth, sustainable growth in real incomes, reducing the poverty rate twofold, and accelerated economic growth¹⁹.

The current political season is no exception. The composition of the Government under the chairmanship of Dmitry Medvedev remains the same, so are the risks of failure to fulfill V. Putin's election promises. If recently the doubts concerning the timely and full implementation of the 2018 national projects were expressed only by experts²⁰, then in recent years, management circles expressed their skepticism as well; and these people in fact bear the main responsibility for the implementation of the May decrees. Thus, at the Moscow Financial Forum held in September 2019, Chairman of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation A. Kudrin said that the current national projects “do not contain sufficient

¹⁹ National projects become an uncomfortable topic for the authorities. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2019, September 23. Available at: http://www.ng.ru/economics/2019-09-23/1_4_7683_proekty.html

²⁰ See, for example: Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, Round Table “Discussion of the national project “International cooperation and export” October 25, 2018. Available at: <https://nangs.org/>

The ONF will seek to include its proposals in the national project “Safe and high-quality roads”. ONF road inspection. Map of bad roads. November 13, 2018. Available at: <https://dorogi-onf.ru/news/5730/>

measures for an economic breakthrough”, and Head of Sberbank G. Gref pointed out that the allegedly “enormous resources” that are invested in national projects are “a myth”, and therefore “national projects will not give the desired effect”.

The results of monitoring the achievement of national goals, posted on the official website of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, suggest that the growing skepticism about the implementation of the tasks of the President has quite good reasons²¹:

✓ Natural population decline, according to experts, continues to increase (-209.7 thousand people in January–July 2019)”.

✓ “To achieve the target value, life expectancy at birth must grow steadily by at least 0.8–0.9 years each year. In 2018, the growth of this indicator was only 0.2 years”.

✓ “There is no reduction in poverty in 2019. In the first half of the year, it exceeded the level of the same period of the previous year by 0.2 percentage points”.

✓ “Taking into account the current data (GDP growth rate of 0.7% in the first half of 2019 instead of 2.3% in January–December 2018), economic growth rate is expected to slow down in 2019 compared to 2018, which creates significant risks of not achieving the target indicator (3.2%)”.

Thus, unfortunately, so far the forecasts of experts, who in 2016 predicted that Russia would “still have the liberal model and balance on the threshold of sustainable development, are coming true”²². Today, political analysts also note that “there is no unity in the economic

²¹ Monitoring the achievement of national goals. *Official Website of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation* (data as of October 3, 2019). Available at: <https://ng.ach.gov.ru/?lang=ru>

²² Sulakshin S.S., Bagdasaryan V.E. et al. *Is Russia Waiting for a Revolution? Issues of Transition to the Post-Liberal Model of Russia* (Algorithm and Scenarios). Moscow: Nauka i politika, 2016. Pp. 669–670.

Table 1. Level of trust in state and non-governmental institutions in 2018–2019 (% of respondents)*

Institution	Level of trust			Level of distrust		
	2018	2019	Dynamics + / – 2019 to 2018	2018	2019	Dynamics + / – 2019 to 2018
President of the Russian Federation	60.5	52.4	-8	9.9	14.4	+5
Church	50.0	46.5	-4	12.8	13.8	+1
Prosecutor's office	47.1	43.5	-4	16.0	18.1	+2
Federal Security Service	45.2	41.0	-4	15.4	17.2	+2
Government of the Russian Federation	47.3	40.9	-6	17.9	22.3	+4
Army	47.2	40.8	-6	14.6	18.2	+4
Police	44.4	40.7	-4	19.4	20.4	+1
Court	45.3	39.3	-6	18.7	20.9	+2
Vologda Oblast Administration	35.4	33.4	-2	25.5	27.2	+2
Federation Council	37.4	32.2	-5	19.8	24.1	+4
Local government	34.4	31.6	-3	27.4	28.7	+1
Scientific organizations	32.8	30.3	-3	15.7	18.3	+3
Trade unions	33.3	29.7	-4	23.7	25.9	+2
State Duma of the Russian Federation	33.8	28.5	-5	25.5	28.9	+3
Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation	31.0	27.4	-4	22.8	27.0	+4
Mass media	29.8	26.6	-3	33.4	34.1	+1
Civic Chamber of the Vologda Oblast	28.3	25.6	-3	25.7	27.6	+2
Non-governmental organizations	28.1	24.9	-3	26.2	27.9	+2
Directors, CEOs	25.1	20.5	-5	30.4	34.1	+4
Political parties, movements	22.3	19.6	-3	34.3	35.9	+2
Banking and business circles	20.7	17.6	-3	35.4	38.2	+3
<i>I don't trust anyone</i>	–	–	–	24.9	28.5	+4

* Ranked according to the level of trust in 2019.
Source: VolRC RAS public opinion monitoring.

team. There is a split. Obviously, the financial and economic bloc of the Government has no clear strategy for economic growth”²³. Russian society expects a completely different (“breakthrough”) course of development of the socio-economic and political situation in the country. Thus, people acutely feel that there is a possibility of non-fulfillment of the President’s election promises and react to it accordingly – their trust in virtually all state and non-governmental institutions, including the President himself, is declining (*Tab. 1*).

The situation in the current political season is aggravated by the fact that this is V. Putin’s

last presidential term and therefore, for him this is the last opportunity to implement his plans, and for society it is the last six-year period under his leadership. Who will be the successor of the current President, how they will be received by Russians, what kind of relations they will build with the West – so far, no one has any idea about this.

The dynamics of public opinion concerning the work of public authorities in 2018 (one of the main events of which was the pension reform, which affected almost all strata of Russian society) allow us to see that the opinion of the President personally is very important to Russians.

In the first half of 2018 (February – June), against the backdrop of the presidential election and V. Putin’s very encouraging Address to the

²³ National projects declared ineffective. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2019, September 15. Available at: http://www.ng.ru/economics/2019-09-15/4_7676_project.html (opinion of political scientist S. Markov).

Table 2. Dynamics of the level of approval of government institutions in 2018–2019 (% of respondents)*

Institution	2018						2019						Dynamics	
	Feb.	Apr.	June	Aug.	Oct.	Dec.	Feb.	Apr.	June	Aug.	Oct.	Dec.	Oct. 2019 to Oct. 2018	Oct. 2019 to June 2018**
RF President	68.7	68.1	70.1	65.9	63.5	61.9	58.7	55.9	55.7	55.8	54.1	-7	-9	-16
RF Prime Minister	48.3	49.9	52	47.4	45.2	45.3	41.6	38.8	40.9	43.1	41.1	-7	-4	-11
Vologda Oblast Governor	39.3	39.5	40.5	37.3	35.7	38.3	36.5	34.7	35.4	36.1	35.6	-5	0	-5
RF Government	40.5	41.9	44.4	40.1	38.5	39	36	33.8	36	37.9	35.1	-6	-3	-9
Heads of local administrations	38.9	39.9	40.7	37.4	36.5	37.4	36.4	34.3	34.7	34.8	32.7	-4	-4	-8
RF Federation Council	34.6	35.3	36.9	33	32.3	33.4	31.5	29.5	31.3	32.2	29.9	-5	-2	-7
RF State Duma	32.7	33.7	35.5	31.7	30.5	31.1	29.6	27.9	29.9	30.3	28.5	-5	-2	-7
Legislative Assembly	31.6	31.9	33.9	30.9	28.6	29.4	27.2	25.8	27.9	28.0	27.7	-5	-1	-6

* Ranked according to the data as of October 2019.
** We compare the data for 2019 with those for June 2018, because it is when the indicators of the level of approval of the President's work were the highest; it is the "base point", after which the share of positive evaluations of his work began to decrease gradually.
Source: VolRC RAS public opinion monitoring.

Federal Assembly, the level of approval²⁴ of the work of all the authorities has increased or remained stable. After the upcoming changes in the pension legislation were officially announced (in June 2018), the level of approval decreased sharply (by 4–5 percentage points). In particular, the support for the President fell from 70 to 66%, for the Prime Minister – from 52 to 47%, for the Federation Council – from 37 to 33%, etc. (Tab. 2).

After V. Putin made a televised public statement with explanations and significant adjustments to the pension reform and then supported the reform (August 29, 2019), the decline in the level of approval of the work of the authorities stopped.

The fact that in general, during the period from June 2018 to October 2019, the level of

²⁴ We should note that the "level of approval" is an indicator that has significant differences from the above level of trust (Tab. 1). The difference is that the level of approval shows the current assessment of the work of state and non-governmental institutions; this indicator is quite dynamic and may depend on certain managerial decisions of the authorities (therefore, we measure the level of approval once every two months).

As for institutional trust, this indicator characterizes people's general (basic) attitude toward state and non-governmental institutions (this indicator appears in the surveys conducted by VolRC RAS twice a year, in April and October).

approval of the work of the authorities decreased significantly (and the level of approval of the work of the President himself decreased by 16 percentage points, from 70 to 54%), is explained, rather, by the "cumulative effect" – the increase in expectations for a "breakthrough" or at least tangible improvement in the quality of life, rather than by the result of any "single" reforms that Russians perceive very negatively. This is indicated by the lack of positive dynamics in the level of approval of the main institutions in Russia since June 2018. Thus, we should note that the "hands-on" approach to managing the entire system of public administration in recent years does not bring positive results.

How do Russians assess the system of public administration apart from the personality of the President of the Russian Federation? We find the answer to this question with the help of analyzing electoral preferences of citizens following the results of the State Duma election that was deprived of the "Putin factor", and the results of the elections of legislative authorities and heads of regions.

According to the findings of our calculations based on official data of the Central Election

Insert 3

Legislative elections in 2017–2019

2017*

Party, Voter turnout	For reference: elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (results of the respective regions, in %)										Legislative elections				Dynamics 2017 to 2012
	Fact		Dynamics		Fact		Dynamics		Fact		Dynamics		Fact		
	2007	2011	2016	2011 to 2007	2016 to 2011	2012	2017	2012 to 2017	2012	2017	2012 to 2017	2012	2017	2012 to 2017	
United Russia	65.04	52.13	55.96	-12.91	+0.98	55.50	62.27	+6.77	1923972	2774232	+850260	1923972	2774232	+850260	
KPRF	12.40	20.32	14.80	+7.93	-5.53	15.08	12.88	-2.20	300010	520939	+220929	300010	520939	+220929	
LDPR	7.75	11.53	12.31	+3.78	+0.78	7.45	8.39	+0.94	302198	369162	+66964	302198	369162	+66964	
Just Russia	7.24	10.60	4.62	+3.36	-5.98	7.54	6.00	-1.54	304849	212625	-92224	304849	212625	-92224	
All other parties						11.84	7.77	-4.07	242591	138229	-104362	242591	138229	-104362	
Turnout	61.22	62.22	51.45	+1.00	-10.77	43.16	44.59	+1.43	3390260	4127238	+736978	3390260	4127238	+736978	

* six regions: Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Udmurt Republic, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Penza Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast.

2018*

Party, Voter turnout	For reference: elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (results of the respective regions, in %)										Legislative elections				Dynamics 2018 to 2013
	Fact		Dynamics		Fact		Dynamics		Fact		Dynamics		Fact		
	2007	2011	2016	2011 to 2007	2016 to 2011	2013	2018	2013 to 2018	2013	2018	2013 to 2018	2013	2018	2013 to 2018	
United Russia	63.22	45.11	48.56	-17.99	+5.18	51.62	41.54	-10.07	4960506	3742003	-1218503	4960506	3742003	-1218503	
KPRF	11.20	21.00	16.31	+9.95	-4.69	13.78	23.14	+9.36	925607	1542165	+616558	925607	1542165	+616558	
LDPR	8.77	13.04	15.82	+3.86	+2.78	8.40	15.04	+6.64	578969	964524	+385555	578969	964524	+385555	
Just Russia	8.43	15.05	6.50	+6.69	-8.55	6.67	8.66	+1.99	435165	600149	+164984	435165	600149	+164984	
All other parties						16.27	7.79	-8.47	877282	478210	-399072	877282	478210	-399072	
Turnout	63.23	57.43	47.05	-5.54	-10.39	39.25	38.73	-0.85	7898331	7622588	-275743	7898331	7622588	-275743	

* 16 regions: Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Kalmykia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of Khakassia, Zabaikalsky Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast, Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

2019*

Party, Voter turnout	For reference: elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (in %) (results of the respective regions, in %)										Legislative elections				Dynamics 2019 to 2014
	Fact		Dynamics		Fact		Dynamics		Fact		Dynamics		Fact		
	2007	2011	2016	2011 to 2007	2016 to 2011	2014	2019	2014 to 2019	2014	2019	2014 to 2019	2014	2019	2014 to 2019	
United Russia	71.99	60.96	60.86	-11.03	-0.53	66.57	51.91	-14.65	5007455	3314596	-1692859	5007455	3314596	-1692859	
KPRF	9.51	16.79	13.24	+7.28	-2.74	10.29	17.06	+6.76	828099	1261988	+433889	828099	1261988	+433889	
LDPR	5.97	8.27	10.42	+2.30	+1.63	6.77	14.48	+8.17	460608	814033	+353425	460608	814033	+353425	
Just Russia	5.99	9.26	3.88	+3.28	-5.33	5.12	6.80	+1.57	405008	498035	+93027	405008	498035	+93027	
All other parties						9.13	9.34	+0.20	841728	1164157	+322429	841728	1164157	+322429	
Turnout	71.80	71.97	58.63	+0.17	-11.42	52.01	47.45	-4.56	7819185	7282171	-537014	7819185	7282171	-537014	

* 13 regions: Republic of Altai, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic of Crimea, Republic of Mari El, Republic of Tatarstan, Republic of Tyva, Khabarovsk Krai, Bryansk Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Tula Oblast, Moscow, Sevastopol.

Elections of heads of regions in 2017–2019

2017*

Party, Voter turnout	Elections of heads of regions										
	%					people					
	Fact		Dynamics		Dynamics 2017 to 2012	Fact		Dynamics 2017 to 2012		Dynamics 2017 to 2012	
2007	2011	2016	2011 to 2007	2016 to 2011		2012	2017	2012	2017		
United Russia	62.83	44.55	48.56	-18.28	+4.01	62.89	74.80	+11.91	2479087	5377972	+2898885
KPRF	11.04	20.01	14.33	+8.97	-5.68	14.44	10.19	-4.25	410060	773329	+363269
LDPR	9.40	13.25	15.03	+3.85	+1.78	8.15	6.64	-1.51	226456	424520	+198064
Just Russia	8.02	15.41	7.59	+7.39	-7.82	5.80	5.76	-0.04	33540	226394	+192854
All other parties	<i>The analysis of the data on the elections to the State Duma was carried out only for the parties that passed to the Parliament</i>										
Self-nomination, nomination by voters	64.70	59.71	47.02	-4.99	-12.69	21.48	3.19	-18.29	1228117	265384	-962733
Turnout	63.56	57.84	46.82	-5.72	-52.34	48.78	0	-48.78	1584851	0	-1584851
Turnout	64.70	59.71	47.02	-4.99	-12.69	50.65	40.54	-10.11	7630195	7229173	-401022

* 16 regions: Republic of Buryatia, Republic of Karelia, Republic of Mari El, Republic of Mordovia, Udmurt Republic, Perm Krai, Belgorod Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Kirov Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast, Sevastopol.

2018*

Party, Voter turnout	Elections of heads of regions										
	%					people					
	Fact		Dynamics		Dynamics 2018 to 2013	Fact		Dynamics 2018 to 2013		Dynamics 2018 to 2013	
2007	2011	2016	2011 to 2007	2016 to 2011		2013	2018	2013	2018		
United Russia	61.20	43.23	46.28	-17.97	+3.04	74.88	62.99	-16.53	11820982	7542935	-4278047
KPRF	12.58	21.82	15.71	+9.23	-6.10	16.29	19.58	+5.11	1548383	1748890	+200508
LDPR	9.77	14.37	16.68	+4.60	+2.31	6.77	14.82	+9.28	772237	1819064	+1046827
Just Russia	7.65	13.70	6.80	+6.05	-6.90	4.33	7.45	+2.89	489990	882723	+392733
All other parties	<i>The analysis of the data on the elections to the State Duma was carried out only for the parties that passed to the Parliament</i>										
Self-nomination, nomination by voters	63.56	57.84	46.82	-5.72	-52.34	0	61.88	+61.88	0	420730	+420730
Turnout	63.56	57.84	46.82	-5.72	-52.34	44.79	42.95	-1.84	17353396	15734149	-1619247

* 22 regions: Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Republic of Khakassia, Altai Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Primorsky Krai***, Khabarovsk Krai, Amur Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Samara Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Moscow, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.

2019*

Party, Voter turnout	Elections of heads of regions										
	%					people					
	Fact		Dynamics		Dynamics 2019 to 2014	Fact		Dynamics 2019 to 2014		Dynamics 2019 to 2014	
2007	2011	2016	2011 to 2007	2016 to 2011		2014	2019	2014	2019		
United Russia	62.83	45.98	47.20	-16.85	+1.22	74.53	71.50	-3.04	7781063	4884756	-2896307
KPRF	11.42	19.38	14.42	+7.96	-4.97	11.47	14.79	+3.33	768109	891525	+123416
LDPR	8.52	13.45	16.59	+4.93	+3.14	5.02	8.21	+3.19	364388	496782	+132394
Just Russia	9.83	15.42	7.68	+5.59	-7.75	5.45	5.27	-0.18	115357	382262	+266905
All other parties	<i>The analysis of the data on the elections to the State Duma was carried out only for the parties that passed to the Parliament</i>										
Self-nomination, nomination by voters	63.03	56.88	44.40	-18.64	-12.48	5.31	3.91	-1.41	434716	474984	+40268
Turnout	63.03	56.88	44.40	-18.64	-12.48	9.78	72.33	+62.55	59806	2301735	+2241929
Turnout	63.03	56.88	44.40	-18.64	-12.48	43.97	44.58	+0.60	9816692	9707126	-109566

* 16 regions (excluding heads of constituent entities of the Russian Federation appointed through a vote in Parliament): Altai Republic, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Kalmykia, Zabaykalsky Krai, Stavropol Krai, Astrakhan Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Kurgan Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Saint Petersburg.

Commission, this factor is common for federal and regional elections, and it affects the voting results more than their objective differences. It is known, for example, that the federal level always attracts more attention of voters, than the regional level (we can see it if we look at voter turnout). It is also known that United Russia participates in parliamentary elections under the slogan “the Party of the President”, and when it comes to the attitude toward the regional authorities, then there immediately emerge corruption scandals and all the negative stuff associated with everyday issues. According to sociologists, the greatest level of people’s discontent is focused in local governments; it is quite natural, taking into account their proximity to everyday life of citizens and the fact that their work can be observed ‘on the spot’”²⁵.

Nevertheless, judging by the results of the analysis, both in regional and federal elections, the trends of support for the ruling party representing the interests of the country’s ruling elite have largely similar and negative dynamics.

According to the results of the 2017 regional elections, support for the party dominating the Parliament increased: in general, in six regions where legislative elections were held, its representatives received by almost one million votes more than in the previous elections (*Table 3; Insert 3*)²⁶.

In 2017, the number of votes cast for the ruling party at the elections of the heads of

constituent entities of the Russian Federation (in 16 regions) increased by almost three million (*Table 3; Insert 4*). Perhaps these positive changes were connected with people’s new hopes for the next political season and the constitutional majority of United Russia in the State Duma.

Table 3. Dynamics of the number of those who voted for the United Russia party in the regional elections of 2017–2019, million people

Type of elections	2017	2018	2019
Elections to the legislative bodies of state power	+0.9 (6)*	-1.2 (16)	-1.7 (13)
Elections of heads of RF constituent entities	+2.9 (16)	-4.3 (22)	-2.9 (16)

* The number of regions in which the elections were held is given in parentheses.

However, the positive changes turned out to be short-lived. Already in 2018, the number of those who voted for United Russia in the elections to the legislative bodies of state power held in 18 constituent entities of the Russian Federation decreased by 1.2 million people, and in the elections of regional leaders (in 22 constituent entities of the Russian Federation) – by 4.3 million people (*Table 3; Insert 3–4*). In four regions (Khabarovsk and Primorsky krais, Republic of Khakassia, Vladimir Oblast), a second round was required for the final determination of the heads of these RF constituent entities.

The results of the 2019 regional elections can be interpreted in different ways. United Russia approached them in quite difficult conditions: many experts predicted a difficult course of voting for it – second rounds, protests... Riots in Moscow, associated with the non-admission of independent candidates for the elections to the Moscow City Duma, clearly show how high the “degree” of public sentiment was.

²⁵ *Russian Everyday Life in Crisis: How Do We Live and What Do We Feel?: Information and Analytical Summary of the Results of a Nationwide Study*. Moscow, 2015. P. 15.

²⁶ In the study, each region was considered separately, and the “previous elections” mean the elections to legislative bodies or to the post of head of constituent entity of the Russian Federation in this particular region. For example, in 2017 legislative elections were held in six RF constituent entities (republics of North Ossetia-Alania and Udmurtia, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Penza, Saratov, Sakhalin oblasts). Previous elections in North Ossetia were held on September 14, 2014, in the Udmurt Republic on September 13, 2015, in the Penza Oblast on October 14, 2012, etc.

A. Mukhin (Director General of the Center for Political Information): **“The processes that took place last year and led to the second round of the gubernatorial elections and the victory of opposition candidates in a number of regions – all of them are still going on”.**

N. Mironov (Head of the Center for Economic and Political Reforms): **“A high degree of unpredictability is one of the most important signs of these elections... There may emerge the necessity to organize second rounds in many regions... In any case (in the first rounds), candidates will win the election with small percentages”**²⁷.

A. Pozhalov (political scientist): “Mass protests occur when the number of critics of the government, including the President, is close to half of the population, and the majority believes that the country is moving to a standstill. **Today we are approaching very close to these indicators”.**

D. Fetisov (political consultant): **“The emergence of a wave of protests is very likely.** It can be stimulated by people’s dissatisfaction with the fact that utility bills will include costs for the removal of household waste and with a significant increase in prices for goods and services”²⁸.

However, in the end, the Single day of voting on September 9, 2019 became not only one of the most ambitious, but also one of the quietest election dates in recent years²⁹. Unlike last year’s elections, there was no need for a second round anywhere; in all regions, the elections were won either by representatives of United Russia (in 10 regions) or by self-nominees actively supported by this party (in six constituent entities of the

²⁷ Experts predict second rounds and coalitions in regional elections. *RIA-Novosti*, 2019, June 5. Available at: <https://ria.ru/20190605/1555267886.html>

²⁸ The year of desacralisation: what political scientists expect from 2019. *RBK Website*, January 5, 2019. Available at: <https://www.rbk.ru/politics/05/01/2019/5c24e8f39a7947a0658b798d>

²⁹ The results of the elections-2019: victory for the Kremlin or a failure of power? *Politonline.ru*, September 9, 2019. Available at: <http://www.politonline.ru/interview/22894497.html>

Russian Federation)³⁰. At the meeting with the President, Chairman of the Central Election Commission E. Pamfilova pointed out that “the campaign, as never before, went quite well”³¹.

From this point of view, we cannot but admit that the ruling party managed to avoid the main problems that cause alarming fears of political scientists. Although it failed to reverse the trends that were observed in the previous federal and regional elections: the number of those who voted for United Russia in the 2019 elections to the legislative bodies of state power held in 13 regions decreased by 1.7 million people compared to the results of 2018 (*Table 3; Insert 3*), and in the elections of heads of regions (in 16 constituent entities of the Russian Federation) – by 2.9 million people (*Table 3; Insert 4*).

Thus, 52% of the votes that the United Russia party received in 2019 in the legislative elections (on average in 13 regions of the country), and 72% of the votes that it received in the elections of heads of regions (on average in 16 regions) are, of course, unattainable figures for the nearest “competitors” among the parliamentary parties (the Communist Party, whose representatives received 17 and 15% of the votes, respectively, and LDPR – 7 and 5%, respectively). **However, this result can be interpreted positively only if we do not pay attention to the dynamic changes in the electoral preferences of Russians.**

In fact, the “quietest” elections show that the alarming trends that have been observed for at least 12 years (since the 2007 State Duma election) are continuing. In the last three State Duma elections (in the period from 2007 to

³⁰ Excluding the regions in which their leaders were determined by a vote in Parliament.

³¹ V. Putin’s meeting with the Chairman of the Central Election Commission E. Pamfilova on October 9, 2019. *Website of the President of the Russian Federation*. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/61762>

2016), United Russia lost almost 17 million votes, and in the last two years (2018–2019) – almost three million supporters in legislative elections and more than seven million – in the elections of heads of constituent entities of the Russian Federation. **In other words, though Russian society supports the President directly, it has less and less trust in the ruling elite represented by United Russia, and this fact raises serious concerns about the transit of state power in the new political season.**

Only real and tangible changes in addressing key issues of concern to the population, such as overcoming excessive inequality, achieving

We have exhausted both the negative possibilities of the 1990s and the positive possibilities of Putin's rule. Everything is completely exhausted. If we want to do something good, we have to do it in a way that is different from how it is done now, or we will go back not just to the 1990s, but to nowhere...**What will happen to us after the end of Putin's term? The people will have to make a fundamental historical choice.** Even if we are denied this choice, it is our duty to break through and decide for or against the future that lies before us. The people cannot but decide – we are approaching a critical point in our history... If we do not make a decision, we will decide “not to be”. This is predetermined by the logic of our history – after a century of existence on the periphery of ourselves, we can return to ourselves. Putin did not solve this problem, but provided an opportunity to do it³².

social justice, and increasing the standard of living and quality of life, can move anything in a positive direction with regard to this issue... The results of voting in the elections devoid of the “Putin factor” indicate that people do not feel these changes yet.

At the same time, the results of the vote indicate that Russian society understands quite well the situation in which Russia finds itself today. No optimistic forecasts, pre-election promises or adjustments in the methods of calculating poverty have a significant impact on the overall outcome of the vote: the level of support for the political force representing the interests of the ruling elites continues to decline. At a meeting on the implementation of national projects Vladimir Putin noted: “People are not interested in abstract promises. The result is what matters for people, here and now, not in some distant future”³³.

In our opinion, this is an extremely important point, because a “fundamental historical choice” in building relations with the successor of the President will have to be made very soon by Russian society, which is becoming increasingly aware of its subjectivity as an actor in political relations.

The President has no more than four years left until 2024, and in many respects it will depend on him what level of tension the social situation in the country will have and how competitive the system of public administration will be in the next political cycle, in which we and our children will have to live.

³² Dugin A. The most important event of the future. *Zavtra*, 2019, May 16. Available at: http://zavtra.ru/blogs/samoe_vazhnoe_sobitie_budushhego

³³ Meeting of the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects, May 8, 2019. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60485>

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